A Demonstration of the Ontological Contradiction of Reflexive Perception

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Except that you have not addressed my previously formulated demonstration of the ontological contradiction of reflexive perception.


You are *consciously* aware of X. To be conscously aware of X is to be consciously aware (even without protracted introspection) that you are aware of X.


These are TWO DISTINCT AND RADICALLY DIFFERENT pieces of information. Your perception of X is not "of its own kind" and separately distinguished from your perception of perceiving X.


And yet your perception of X is *perceived as* indepedent of you ... a wholly external reality (for "immanent" sense percept, and as self part but not intrinsic for memorial or imaginative percept),


Everybody's self describable and commonly described EXPERIENCE of conscious perception PRESENTS its own simultaneously contradictory view in each conscious instant. It's (partially) illusory nature is part of its very existence reaffirmed and confirmable in every conscious introspective instant.


You cannot deny the perception that you *perceive* your thoughts as separate and controlled by "you" ... and yet they are NOT external to you and cannot perceive the thought without the perception of perceiving it.


ALL and continuously all introspective representations ARE (in part) misrepresentations.


You tell me, Myron, have philosophers noticed this self contradiction in the nature of perception? (I'm sure they have ... while I can't think of a specific cite I'm quite certain I've read at least glancing mentions of it). Why is this obvious malrepresentation of introspective "knowledge" not front and center in philosophical discussions of consciousness?


It fits very well with materialist representations generally and EXTREMELY well with HOT models.


But of course it (in and of itself!) contradicts those upholding the incorrigibility of phenomenal experience.


-- TWZ